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Abstract
We introduce a new unified framework for modelling both decision
problems and finite games based on quantifiers and selection functions.
We show that the canonical utility maximisation is one special case
of a quantifier and that our more abstract framework provides several
additional degrees of freedom in modelling. In particular, incomplete
preferences, non-maximising heuristics, and context-dependent mo-
tives can be taken into account when describing an agent’s goal. We
introduce a suitable generalisation of Nash equilibrium for games in
terms of quantifiers and selection functions. Moreover, we introduce a
refinement of Nash that captures context-dependency of goals. Mod-
elling in our framework is compositional as the parts of the game are
modular and can be easily exchanged. We provide an extended ex-
ample where we illustrate concepts and highlight the benefits of our
alternative modelling approach.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we introduce a new formal framework to reason about decision
problems and finite games. This framework has been developed in computer
science as a game theoretical approach to proof theory1 and is based on higher
order functions [6, 7]. We adopt and develop it further to make it accessible
to economics.
The core concept is the modelling of the agent’s goal as a quantifier, i.e.
a higher-order function of type (X → R)→ R, where X is the set of choices
and R is the set of possible outcomes. A corresponding notion is that of a
selection function, i.e. a higher-order function of type (X → R)→ X which
calculates a choice that “meets” the desired goal. In Section 2 we have a
brief introduction to higher-order functions, and give the precise definitions of
quantifiers and selection functions. We will also illustrate how these provide
a powerful and flexible way to model agents.
In economic theory, agents are typically assumed to maximise an utility
function. This is a special case of a quantifier and a particularly structured
outcome space, max: (X → R) → R. The corresponding selection function
is argmax: (X → R) → X . Our aim with this paper is to show that repre-
senting decision problems and games in the more abstract form of quantifiers
and selection functions offers three advantages over the special cases of max
and argmax.
First, selection functions and quantifiers are more expressive as they pro-
vide additional degrees of freedom in modelling behaviour. Different quanti-
fiers other than the max operator are possible, for instance, decision heuris-
tics where agents do not fully optimise. The outcome space can have any
structure and is not restricted to the structure imposed by utility functions
(or, equivalently, rational preferences). In particular, one can directly model
preference relations that are incomplete. Also, since quantifiers and selec-
tion functions take functions as input, context-dependent goals (where not
1Proof theory is a branch of mathematical logic which investigates the structure and
meaning of formal mathematical proofs. It has been recently discovered that certain
proofs of high logical complexity can be interpreted as computer programs which compute
equilibria of suitable generalised games.
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only outcomes matter but also how outcomes come about) can be seamlessly
modelled. In Section 3 we explain how these generalisations can be done step
by step and give various examples.
As a second advantage, quantifiers and selection functions model not only
decisions but also interactions and thereby unify decision problems and games
in one formal framework. In Section 4 we formally introduce games and a
generalised notion of Nash equilibrium in terms of quantifiers. As it is possi-
ble to define an equilibrium in terms of selection functions, we also introduce
what we call selection Nash equilibrium. We prove that Nash equilibrium
and selection equilibrium are isomorphic in the case of classical operators
max and argmax. Moreover, we prove that, generally, this isomorphism does
not hold true: For other quantifiers and selection functions the two different
concepts yield different sets of equilibria. In fact, the selection equilibrium
is a refinement of the generalised Nash equilibrium.
The third advantage of our approach is compositionality in modelling.
We think of a game as consisting of a global outcome function determining
outcomes for each given play of the game, and local quantifiers or selection
functions describing each of the particular players’ intentions. Selection func-
tions and quantifiers are modular as, for instance, if in a particular game,
one would like to consider the consequences of changing the preferable out-
comes for one player, only this player’s quantifier or selection function need
to change. This is of particular advantage in the case of context-dependent
goals. With utility functions it may be necessary to redefine the outcome
space or to manipulate payoffs by hand such that a context-dependency is
encoded. In Section 6 we discuss at length the relationship between games
based on classical payoff functions and based on selection function as well as
how to automatically compile a selection function game into a classical one.
All these concepts are illustrated in Section 5 where we provide an ex-
tended example. We consider several variants of a beauty contest. While
the rules of the contest are fixed, the goals of agents change from variant to
variant to illustrate the compositionality of the selection function approach.
We begin with considering agents who care about the outcome of the beauty
contest. Next, we introduce some agents who only care about choosing the
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winner of the contest, i.e. the votes of the other players. We show how
this concern can be nicely modelled as a context-dependent fixpoint quan-
tifier: The agent wants his vote to be the same as the majority decision of
the overall game. Beyond this particular example, we discuss how fixpoint
operations in general capture coordination goals of agents at a higher level,
highlighting again the expressivity of selection functions. As a last point, this
example also teaches the intuition about the selection equilibrium, and how
it refines the generalised Nash, as it takes into account goals that depend on
the context under which they are attained.
A notable feature of our approach, which we do not explore in detail in this
paper but still consider to be important, is that it is directly implementable in
functional programming languages such as Haskell. Hence, large and complex
games can be programmed and computer assistance in analysing these games
is readily available. This is discussed in Section 7.
2 Quantifiers and Selection Functions
A higher order function (or functional) is a function whose domain is itself
a set of functions. Given sets X and Y we denote by X → Y the set of
all functions with domain X and codomain Y . A higher order function is
therefore a function f : (X → Y )→ Z where X , Y and Z are sets.
A simple example of a higher order function is the function that evalulates
its argument at a constant point. To give a specific example, we take the
sets R (real numbers) and Z (integers), and pick a constant real number,
such as pi. We can then define a function Φ : (R→ Z)→ Z by the equation
Φ(f) = f(pi). We can illustrate the behaviour of Φ by giving it a specific
function f : R → Z as an input. For example, let f be the function that
takes a real number to its integer lower bound. The integer lower bound to
pi is 3, therefore Φ(f) = 3.
There are familiar examples of higher-order functions, for example in the
maximum operator the name of the variable which ranges over the set X is
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not relevant, i.e.
max
x∈X
f(x) = max
y∈X
f(y)
and similarly with the variable over which one performs integration, i.e.
∫
f(x) dx =
∫
f(y) dy
In this section we define two particular classes of higher-order functions:
quantifiers and selection functions. Subsequently (Section 3) we represent
the classical approach to decision theory via preference relations and max
and argmax operators within the new formalism. We will also explain how
to arrive at the notion of a quantifier via a series of generalisations from
utility functions.
2.1 Quantifiers
Suppose we have an agent A. We can place A into any economic situation
or context and observe his motivations and his choices. We know that he is
deterministic (or predictable) in the sense that his moves are not dependent
on chance.2
By a ‘situation’ or ‘context’ we mean an object that encodes all of the rel-
evant information the agent could consider when choosing a move or strategy.
Assume our agent is choosing a move in the set X , and the set of possible
final outcomes is R. The context will normally include other agents and all
the other choices that together with the choice of our agent A will determine
a final outcome. If all we care about is the final outcome, then our context
can be modelled simply by a function p : X → R that maps each of the
agent’s moves to a specific outcome. In other words, to give the context of
an agent is the same as to define precisely what final outcomes will result
after each of the agent’s choices. That is all that our agent needs to know
about this “context” in order to make the good choice.
Definition 2.1 (Agent context). For an agent A choosing a move from a set
2This is without loss of generality, because we can always allow the set of outcomes to
be a set of probability distributions.
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X, having in sight a final outcome in a set R, we call any function p : X → R
a possible context for the agent A.
Suppose that A makes a decision in the context p. Then the agent will
consider some outcomes to be good (or acceptable), and other outcomes to
be bad. We are going to allow the set of outcomes that the agent considers
good to be totally arbitrary.
Definition 2.2 (Quantifier, [6, 7]). Mappings
ϕ : (X → R)→ P(R)
from contexts p : X → R to sets of outcomes φ(p) ⊆ R are called quantifiers3.
If ϕ(p) 6= ∅ for all p : X → R we say that the quantifier ϕ is total.
We be will modelling agentsA as quantifiers ϕA, and in such cases we wish
to think of ϕ(p) as the set of outcomes the agent A considers preferable in
each context p : X → R. Our main objective in this paper is to convince the
reader that this is a general, modular, and highly flexible way of describing
an agent’s goal or objective.
The classical example of a quantifier is utility maximisation. In this case
the set of outcomes is R = Rn, where the ith element represents the utility
of the i-th player. Given a context p : X → Rn, the good outcomes for the
ith player are precisely those for which the ith coordinate, i.e. his utility
function, is maximal. This quantifier is given by
i-max(p) = {r ∈ Im(p) | ri ≥ p(x
′)i for all x
′ ∈ X}
where Im(p) denotes the image of the function p : X → R. Note that the
image mapping Im(·) is itself a quantifier, although not a particularly in-
teresting one, as it corresponds to the agent that considers any possible
attainable outcome to be good.
3The terminology comes from the observation that the usual existential ∃ and universal
∀ quantifiers of logic can be seen as operations of type (X → B) → B, where B is the
type of booleans. Mostowski [16] also called arbitrary functionals of type (X → B) → B
generalised quantifiers. We are choosing to generalise this further by replacing the booleans
B with an arbitrary type R, and allowing for the operation to be multi-valued.
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Definition 2.3 (Context-independent quantifiers). A quantifier ϕ : (X →
R) → P(R) is said to be context-independent if the value ϕ(p) only depen-
dents on Im(p), i.e.
Im(p) = Im(p′) =⇒ ϕ(p) = ϕ(p′).
Hence, a quantifier ϕ will be called context-dependent if for some contexts
p and p′, with Im(p) = Im(p′), the sets of preferred outcomes ϕ(p) and ϕ(p′)
are different.
Intuitively, a context-dependent quantifier will select good outcomes not
just based on which outcomes are possible, but will also take into account
how the outcomes are actually achieved. It is easy to see that the quantifier
i-max(p) is context-independent, since it can be written as a function of
Im(p) only. An example of a context-dependent quantifier is the fixpoint
operator. Recall that a fixpoint of a function f : X → X is a point x ∈ X
satisfying f(x) = x. When the set of moves is equal to the set of outcomes
there is a quantifier whose good outcomes are precisely the fixpoints of the
context. If the context has no fixpoint and the agent will be equally happy
(or equally unhappy) with any outcome, then the quantifier is given by
fix : (X → X)→ P(X)
fix(p) =


{x ∈ X | p(x) = x} if nonempty
X otherwise
Clearly fix(·) is context-dependent, since we could have two maps p, p′ : X →
X having the same image set Im(p) = Im(p′) but with p and p′ having
different sets of fixed points.
We will discuss several examples of fixpoint quantifiers at great length in
Section 5.
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2.2 Selection Functions
Just as a quantifier tells us which outcomes an agent considers good in each
given context, one can also consider the higher-order function that determines
which moves an agent considers good in any given context.
Definition 2.4 (Selection functions). A selection function is any function
of the form
ε : (X → R)→ P(X)
If ε(p) 6= ∅ for all p : X → R we say that the selection function is total.
We will mainly consider total selection functions and quantifiers, because
the agent must always have some preferred outcomes and moves.
In the computer science literature where selection functions have been
considered previously [6, 7] the focus was on single-valued ones. However, as
multi-valued selection functions are extremely important in our examples we
have adapted the definitions accordingly.
Similarly to quantifiers, the canonical example of a selection function is
maximising one coordinate in Rn, defined by
i-argmax(p) = {x ∈ X | p(x)i ≥ p(x
′)i for all x
′ ∈ X}
Even in one-dimensional R1 the argmax selection function is naturally multi-
valued: a function may attain its maximum value at several different points.
There is an important relation between quantifiers and selection functions
called attainment. Intuitively this means that the outcome of a good move
should be a good outcome.
Definition 2.5. Given a quantifier ϕ : (X → R) → P(R) and a total
selection function ε : (X → R) → P(X), we say that ε attains ϕ iff for all
contexts p : X → R it is the case that
x ∈ ε(p) =⇒ p(x) ∈ ϕ(p)
Clearly, if ϕ is attainable then it is also total.
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The attainability relation holds between the quantifier maxi and the se-
lection function argmaxi. The fixpoint quantifier is also itself a selection
function, and it attains itself since
x ∈ fix(p) =⇒ p(x) ∈ fix(p)
Given a selection function ε, we can form the ‘smallest’ quantifier which
it attains as follows.
Definition 2.6. Given a selection function ε : (X → R)→ P(X), define the
quantifier ε : (X → R)→ P(R) as
ε(p) = {p(x) | x ∈ ε(p)}.
We can use the mapping between selection functions and quantifiers in
order to transfer back properties of quantifiers to selection functions. For
instance, we can then say that a selection function ε : (X → R) → P(X)
is context-independent if its associated quantifier ε : (X → R) → P(R) is
context-independent. Here are the three main properties of the map ε 7→ ε.
Proposition 2.7. Given any selection function ε : (X → R) → P(X) the
following three properties are easy to check:
(i) Totality. If ε is total then so is the quantifier ε.
(ii) Attainability. If ε is total then ε attains ε.
(iii) Minimality. ε(p) ⊆ ϕ(p), for any quantifier ϕ attainable by ε.
Therefore, the good outcomes according to the quantifier ε : (X → R)→
P(R) are exactly the outcomes resulting from good moves according to the
selection function ε : (X → R)→ P(X).
Conversely, for a quantifier ϕ : (X → R) → P(R) we can define a corre-
sponding selection function as follows.
Definition 2.8. Given a quantifier ϕ : (X → R) → P(R), define the selec-
tion function ϕ : (X → R)→ P(X) as
ϕ(p) = {x | p(x) ∈ ϕ(p)}.
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We use the same “overline” notation, as it will be clear from the context
whether we are applying it to a quantifier or a selection function.
Proposition 2.9. Given any quantifier ϕ : (X → R) → P(R) the following
three properties are easy to check:
(i) Totality. If ϕ is attainable then the selection function ϕ is total.
(ii) Attainability. If ϕ is attainable then ϕ attains ϕ.
(iii) Maximality. ε(p) ⊆ ϕ(p), for any selection function ε attaining ϕ.
Let us briefly reflect on the game-theoretic meaning of attainability, and
the translations between quantifiers and selection functions. Suppose we
have a quantifier ϕ which describes the outcomes that an agent considers
to be good. The quantifier might be unrealistic in the sense that it has no
attainable good outcome. For example, an agent may consider it a good
outcome if he received a million dollars, but in his current context there
may just not be a move available which will lead to this outcome. Given
a context p, the set of attainable outcomes is precisely the image of p. A
realistic quantifier is simply a quantifier in which every context with a good
outcome has an attainable good outcome. We can write it in symbols as
ϕ(p) 6= ∅ =⇒ ϕ(p) ∩ Im(p) 6= ∅.
Proposition 2.10. For a total quantifier ϕ the following are equivalent
• ϕ is realistic,
• ϕ is attainable,
• ϕ is total.
Thus total selection functions are a way to describe total realistic quan-
tifiers. One can consider translating quantifiers into selection function and
back into quantifiers, or conversely.
Proposition 2.11. For all p : X → R we have ϕ(p) = ϕ(p) and ε(p) ⊆ ε(p).
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The proposition above shows that on quantifiers the double-overline op-
eration calculates the same quantifier we started with. However, on selection
functions the the mapping ε 7→ ε can be viewed as a closure operator. Intu-
itively, the new selection function ε will have the same good outcomes as the
original one, but it might consider many more moves to be good as well, as
it does not distinguish moves which both lead to equally good outcomes. As
such, one can think of multi-valued selection function as a finer way to de-
scribe agents’ motivations. As we will see in Section 4, selection functions are
also crucial to define a useful equilibrium concept for games with agents who
have context-dependent quantifiers, which is finer than previously considered
equilibrium concepts.
Remark 2.12. The theory of quantifiers and selection functions has been
developed in stages. Single-valued selection functions and quantifiers in the
general form used here first appeared in [6], unifying earlier definitions in
proof theory and type theory. That is also where the connection between
selection functions and game theory also first established. Multi-valued quan-
tifiers appeared in [7], which allows us to capture more important examples in
a more natural way. The connections between selection functions and game
theory were explored in more depth in [8] and [10], and the latter contains
the definition of attainment given here. Finally [11] contains the terminology
context and the definition of a realistic quantifier.
3 Decisions
In this section we relate the concepts of quantifiers and selection functions to
the standard utility approach in decision theory. We show that the choices
motivated by utility maximisation are a special case of context-independent
quantifiers. Next, we show that the set of context-independent quantifiers
contains elements that allow to model decisions with fewer assumptions than
utility theory and also in a more expressive way. Lastly, we consider quan-
tifiers that are context-dependent. We provide examples along the way to
illustrate the concepts.
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Suppose R is the set of possible final outcomes, and each agent i has a
partial order relation i on R, so that x i y means that agent i prefers the
outcome x to y. These partial orders lead to choice functions fi : P(R) →
P(R) where fi(S) are the maximal elements in the set of possible outcomes
S with respect to the order i. Note that these fi satisfy fi(S) ⊆ S, and
fi(S) 6= ∅ for non-empty S.
Every such fi can be turned into a quantifier ϕi in a generic way, using
the fact that the image operator is a higher-order function Im : (X → R)→
P(R):
(X → R)
Im
−→ P(R)
fi
−→ P(R)
so that fi ◦ Im: (X → R)→ P(R) are quantifiers.
Proposition 3.1. Assume |X| ≥ |R|. Then a quantifier φ : (X → R) →
P(R) is context-independent if and only if φ = f ◦ Im, for some choice
function f : P(R)→ P(R).
Proof. If φ = f ◦ Im then clearly φ is context-independent. For the other
direction, note that since |X| ≥ |R| we have for any subset S ⊆ R a map
uS : X → R such that Im(uS) = S. Hence, assume φ is context-independent
and define f(S) = φ(uS). Clearly,
φ(p) = φ(uIm(p)) = f(Im(p))
where the first step uses that φ is context-independent and that Im(p) =
Im(uIm(p)) by the assumption on the family of maps uS.
Agents who are defined by context-independent quantifiers are choosing
the set of good outcomes simply by ranking the set of outcomes that can be
achieved in a given context; but are forgetting all the information about how
each of the outcomes arise from particular choices of moves. For instance,
we might have a set of actions that will lead us to earn some large sums of
money. Some of these, however, might be illicit. A maximising agent defined
in a context-independent way would choose the outcome that gives himself
the maximum return. If we have control over which actions lead to which
outcomes, we might consider other choices as preferable.
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Proposition 3.2. Whenever fi is a choice function arising from a partial
order i, then the context-independent quantifier φi = fi ◦ Im is attainable
(and hence realistic).
Proof. Define a selection function for φi as
εi(p) = {x | p(x) is i-maximal in Im(p)}.
Clearly if x ∈ εi(p) then p(x) ∈ fi(Im(p)) = φi(p). Also, ε(p) is total, since
Im(p) is always non-empty.
3.1 Rational Preferences and Utility Functions
The usual approach to model behaviour in economics is to either postulate
a preference relation on the set of alternatives or to directly assume a utility
function [14]. Typically, a certain structure is imposed on preference relations
mainly for two reasons: either because additional structure is deemed to be a
characteristic of an agent’s rationality4, or because one wishes to work with
utility functions. It is a classical result that for utility functions to exist,
preferences relations have to be rational [14].
Now, rational preferences and utility functions are special cases of the
generic construction of a context-independent quantifier we outlined in the
last section. They are special because (i) we impose additional structure on
R, that is, i is a total preorder and (ii) we focus on one particular fi, that
is, fi : P(R)→ P(R) defined by
fi(S) = {i -maximal elements of S}
A rational preference relation can always be represented by a utility func-
tion. Translated into the selection function approach, the utility function can
be characterised as the environment which is a mapping p : X → R, attach-
ing a real number to each element of the set of choices X . So, we can define
4This issue has been intensely debated, see [21, 15, 14].
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the quantifier
φ(p) = max p
which is attained by the selection function
ε(p) = argmax p
Note the types φ : (X → R) → P(R) and ε : (X → R) → X respectively
and that ε(p) = φ(p). Thus, max and argmax operators, which are univer-
sally used in the economic literature, become the prototypical examples of a
context-independent quantifier and a selection function attaining it.
We can use selection functions in situations where instead of using utility
functions we directly work with preferences. We demonstrate this with the
following example.
Example 3.3. Consider a simple decision problem of an agent who has to
choose between three alternatives X = {A,B,C}. Assume the agent has the
following (total and transitive) preference order5 {A 1 B , B 1 C , A 1
C}. To use the standard maximisation tools one would associate each alter-
native with some numerical payoff or define an utility function for the agent.
For example, assume that the payoff of the agent is equal to pA = 1 if he
chooses alternative A, pB = 0.5 if he chooses B and pC = 0 otherwise. Then
the utility function u(x) = px represents the preferences of the agent.
We can work with this utility function in the selection function framework.
The utility function is then just the environment p : X → R and the quan-
tifier is the max operator, the selection function is the argmax operator, re-
spectively.
But we also can work directly with the preference order. Then, our environ-
ment function is p : X → X. And we obtain a quantifier and a selection
function, which takes the maximal element with respect to the preference or-
5We use an index in the ordering as we will consider further refinements of this example
in the rest of this section.
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dering 1, namely
φ1(p) = max
x∈(X,1)
p(x) and ε1(p) = argmax
x∈(X,1)
p(x).
3.2 Beyond Rational Preferences
The generic construction of context-independent quantifiers instantiates choices
based on rational preferences (or equivalently on utility maximisation) as
special cases. In this section we show that we can go beyond these cases by
allowing for a different structure on R or by allowing for a different fi (or by
relaxing both).
Utility functions are considered as a very convenient tool to represent
and analyse choice behaviour. Still, the assumption that the preorder is to-
tal, which guarantees the existence of a utility function, is demanding and
in fact more demanding than is necessary to rationalise choice behaviour
[21]. Secondly, when taking the perspective of preferences, from a posi-
tive as well as a normative viewpoint, there are good reason why a rational
decision-maker may exhibit “indecisiveness”, meaning that his preference for
a pair of outcomes is not defined [2]. Thirdly, consider a situation where the
economist or some other agents/principal has only partial information about
the preferences of an agent and considers him “as if” he has incomplete pref-
erences [5]. Lastly, R may be a set of alternatives to be chosen by a group
of agents. Even if each individual’s preferences are complete, the aggregate
social welfare ordering does not have to be [17].
There have been various attempts to change standard formalisms to allow
for an utility theory without the need to fulfil the completeness assumption.6
When working with quantifiers and selection functions, the set of outcomes
R can have any order. In particular, the preference relation does not have
to be total. That is, given any preference relation ⊆ R × R, an agent
chooses the best alternatives as outlined above. So, one can very easily
consider choices not in the scope of utility functions without the need to
6For an important early contribution see [2]. More recent contributions include [17]
for utility representations in certain environments and [5] for uncertain environments. See
also references in [17].
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change the framework. To be clear, the selection function corresponding to
the preference ordering is
argmax(p) = {x ∈ X | r  p(x) =⇒ r 6∈ Im(p)}
ie. a maximal outcome is one which is not known to be worse than any
attainable outcome.
Example 3.4. Continuing from our earlier Example 3.3, suppose the agent,
who has to choose between alternatives X = {A,B,C}, prefers A over B,
but he has incomplete preferences and cannot rank the alternative C. In this
case the order relation is simply A 2 B. In our setting this is seamlessly
dealt with, as we are simply picking the maximal element with respect to this
partial ordering. In particular, the quantifiers and selection functions are the
same, only the ordering has changed
φ2(p) = max
x∈(X,2)
p(x) and ε2(p) = argmax
x∈(X,2)
p(x).
Note that it is not directly possible to use the max operator and a utility
function for the last example. However, using selection functions and working
directly on the preorders, we can just use the same operator as for preference
orders that are total.
3.3 Beyond Maximisation and Standard Rationality
The utility approach is intimately linked to the assumption that the agent
fully optimises. The behavioural economic literature as well as the psycholog-
ical literature have documented deviations from optimising behaviour, and
have collected various decision “heuristics” [4, 12]. Quantifiers provide a nice
way to model such deviations. Moreover, even situations that can be mod-
elled with utility functions may have (more) natural representations in the
quantifier framework.
Example 3.5. Consider a simple heuristic of a person ordering wine in a
restaurant. Suppose he always chooses the second most-expensive wine. In
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terms of selection functions, let X be the set of wines available in a restaurant,
and p : X → R the price attached to each wine xi (i = 1, ..., N) on the menu.
Denote with ri = p(xi) the price of wine xi. Given a maximal strict chain
rn > rn−1 > . . . > r1 in R, let us call rn−1 a sub-maximal element. The
“goal” of the agent can be described by the quantifier
φ>(p
X→R) = {sub-maximal elements with respect to > within Im(p)}.
Such quantifiers are attainable with selection functions
ε>(p
X→R) = {x | p(x) is a sub-maximal element of Im(p)}
since clearly p(x) ∈ φ>(p) for x ∈ ε>(p).
A crucial point of the above example is the additional degree of freedom
of modelling as it is possible to vary the choice operator itself and not being
automatically restricted to the max operator and to consider behaviour to
be rationalised by preferences.7
Obviously, one could rationalise the above choice as the outcome of a
maximisation. One could redefine preferences and utility functions such that
the outcome of the maximisation is just the second most expensive wine.8
However, while equivalent in outcome, the causal model of behaviour is dif-
ferent. The classical approach would force the choice to be rational, whereas
in our setting this question remains open. The quantifier just formally de-
scribes an agent’s behaviour. It could be that the choice pattern is a habitual
heuristic or it could be the reduced form pattern of rational decision-making
in a larger context.
Of course, instead of using the second most expensive wine, one could
consider alternative heuristics, such as choosing the wine closest to the av-
erage price of all available wines on the menu, or within a class of wines,
etc..
7In some sense, our viewpoint is similar to choice rules or choice functions. The be-
haviour is the focal point of analysis. See [15] or [22].
8Note, if the prices of the wines represented preferences, a rationalisation of 2nd best
choices were not possible (see [22]).
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Moreover, one could also combine this heuristic with preferences. Say,
the guest is a fan of white wines, and he strictly prefers Chardonnay over
Riesling. One could model the agent as first restricting the choices to the
wines that are Chardonnay (if available) and then apply his second most
expensive decision heuristic to the class of Chardonnay available.
3.4 Context-Dependent Decision Problem
So far, we have focused only on the generic context-independent quantifiers.
As the last examples illustrate with this construction we can already go
beyond choices motivated by rational preferences. Yet, we can do more. We
can allow for quantifiers that do not only take the image of p as input but
the complete function.
Next, we provide an example to illustrate that this opens up a complete
new dimension. Indeed, with context-dependent quantifiers it is possible to
go far beyond what can be modelled using utility functions.
Example 3.6 (Keynesian beauty contest). Consider the following situation:
there are three players, the judges J = {J1, J2, J3}. Each judge votes for two
contestants A and B. The set of outcomes is given by X = {A,B} denoting
the winner of the contest. The winner is determined by the simple majority
rule of type maj : X × X × X → X. To begin with, we assume that the
judges rank the contestants according to a preference ordering. For example,
suppose judges 1 and 2 prefer A and judge 3 prefers B. We consider the
decision problem of the first judge who observes the choices of two others.
Suppose, judge 1 observes that judge 2 votes for A and judge 3 votes for B,
and he has to decide how to cast his vote. The order relation of the first judge
is A 1 B. Thus we obtain a quantifier and a selection function, which is
taking the maximal element with respect to the ordering, as before:
φ1(p) = max
x∈(X,1)
p(x) ε1(p) = argmax
x∈(X,1)
p(x)
Now, assume judges 2 and 3 continue to prefer contestants A and B respec-
tively, but judge 1 has different preferences: he prefers to support the winner
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of the contest. He is only interested in voting for the winner of the contest
and he has no preferences for the contestants per se. Again, judge 1 observes
that judges 2 and 3 vote for contestants A and B. He can be described by a
fixed point operator:
ϕ′1(p) = ε
′
1(p) = {x ∈ {A,B} | p(x) = x}
In practice, most functions do not have a fixed point and so the fixed
point quantifier will often give the empty set. For the purposes of modelling
a particular situation we might want to ‘complete’ ϕ in different ways, de-
scribing what an agent might do in the event that no fixed point exists. Our
examples in Section 5 suggest that the best way to do this is to return the en-
tire set X , modelling the fact that the agent is equally ‘happy’ (or unhappy)
with any choice if no good choice exists.
The situation above becomes far more interesting when considered as a
game in which several agents with potentially different concerns cast a vote.
We analyse this in detail in Section 5.
4 General Games
Quantifiers and selection functions as introduced in the previous section for
decision problems can be directly adapted to model games. All the additional
expressiveness introduced before can be used in games as well. In this section,
we first define a game and the adequate Nash equilibrium concept. Moreover,
we define a refinement of Nash equilibria that becomes relevant with context-
dependent quantifiers.
Definition 4.1 (General Games). A general n-players game, with a set R
of outcomes and sets Xi of strategies for the ith player, consists of
1. for each player 1 ≤ i ≤ n, a selection function
εi : (Xi → R)→ P(Xi)
representing that player’s preferred strategies in each game context.
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2. the outcome function
q :
n∏
i=1
Xi → R
i.e., a mapping from the strategy profile to the final outcome.
Intuitively, we think of the outcome function q as representing the ‘sit-
uation’, or the rules of the game, while we think of the selection functions
as describing the agents. Thus we can imagine the same agent in different
situations, and different agents in the same situation. This allows us to de-
compose a modelling problem into a global and a local part: modelling the
situation and modelling the players.
Remark 4.2 (Strategic game [18]). The ordinary definition of a strategic
game of n- players with standard payoff functions is a particular case of
Definition 4.1 when
• for each player i set of strategies Xi
• the set of outcomes R is Rn, modelling the vector of payoffs obtained
by each player,
• the selection function of player i is i-argmax: (Xi → R
n) → P(Xi),
i.e. argmax with respect to the i-th coordinate, representing the idea
that each player is solely interested in maximising their own payoff,
• the i-th component of the outcome function q :
∏n
i=1Xi → R
n can be
viewed as the payoff function qi :
∏n
j=1Xj → R of the i-th player.
In the following when we refer to normal forms games we mean the special
case of Definition 4.1 with outcome type and selection functions as above.
We illustrate this by modelling the classic “Battle of the Sexes” game
using our framework.
Example 4.3 (Battle of the Sexes). A couple agrees to meet together, but
both cannot remember if they will be attending the ballet (B) or a football
match (F). The husband prefers football over ballet, while the wife prefers
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Table 1: Battle of the Sexes
Strategy Ballet Football
Ballet 3,2 1,1
Football 0,0 2,3
ballet over football. But irrespective of their personal preferences, they would
rather be together than by themselves in different places. In this game the
set of outcomes is R = R2 and the possible strategies for both players are
Xh = Xw = {B,F}. What is normally described as the payoff matrix for
us shall be viewed as the outcome function Xw × Xh → R, i.e. a mapping
from strategy profiles to outcomes. For the game in question the outcome
function is shown in Table 1. As standard in classical game theory, both
players in this case are trying to maximise their corresponding coordinate of
the outcome tuple (rw, rh), i.e. the wife wants to maximise rw whereas the
husband would like to maximise rh. Therefore, the selection functions for the
two players are the maximisation functions
• εw(p) = {rw | p(rw) = maxx∈Xw pi1(p(x))}
• εh(p) = {rh | p(rh) = maxx∈Xh pi2(p(x))}
where pi1, pi2 : R
2 → R are the first and second projections, respectively.
Note the types of the selection functions are εw : (Xw → R) → P(Xw) and
εh : (Xh → R)→ P(Xh).
In order to illustrate the need for multi-valued selection functions, let us
also consider an extension of the Battle of the Sexes game where an interme-
diate possibility is included, namely going to the cinema (C ). Consider also
that if the husband had to go alone somewhere he would prefer football over
cinema, and cinema over ballet. The wife on the other hand, if she had to go
alone, she would prefer ballet over cinema, and cinema over football. If they
are together then the husband would prefer to be at the football, but would
consider ballet and cinema almost as nice. For the wife, if they are together
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Table 2: Extended Battle of the Sexes
Strategy Ballet Cinema Football
Ballet 3,2 2,1 2,2
Cinema 1,0 2,2 1,2
Football 0,0 0,1 2,3
she would rather be at the ballet, but would consider being at the football
or cinema equally pleasant.
Example 4.4 (Extended Battle of the Sexes I). In this extended version of
the Battle of Sexes the set of outcomes is R = R2 and the possible strategies
for both players are Xh = Xw = {B,C, F}. The outcome function is shown
in Table 2. But notice that although we have extended the game by expanding
the sets of strategies, and hence the outcome function, the selection functions
of both husband and wife are still the same as in Example 4.3, as they both
still aim to maximise their own payoffs.
4.1 Nash Equilibrium
Consider a strategy profile x ∈
∏n
i=1Xi. The outcome of this strategy profile
is q(x). We want to define the context in which one player unilaterally
changes his strategy. This is given by the function
U qi (x)(x) = q(x[i 7→ x])
of type
U qi :
n∏
j=1
Xj → (Xi → R).
Here x[i 7→ x] is the tuple obtained from x by replacing the ith entry with
x. We call the n functions U qi (1 ≤ i ≤ n) the unilateral maps of a given
strategy profile x. They were introduced in [10] in which it is shown that
the proof of Nash’s theorem amounts to showing that the unilateral maps
have certain topological (continuity and closure) properties. The concept of a
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context was introduced later in [11], so now we can say that U qi (x) : Xi → R
is the context in which the ith player has unilaterally changed his strategy,
so we call it a unilateral context.
Example 4.5 (Extended Battle of the Sexes II). Continuing from Example
4.4, let us illustrate the notion of a unilateral map. Consider the wife (w)
and the strategy profile x = (B,C), i.e. she decided to go the the ballet and
he goes to the cinema. Her unilateral context with respect to this strategy
profile is U qw(B,C)(x) = q(x, C). Or, unfolding the definition of q this can
be written more explicitly as
U qw(B,C)(x) =


(2, 1) if x = B
(2, 2) if x = C
(0, 1) if x = F.
The map describes what are the possible payoffs as the wife explores her differ-
ent choices given that the choice of the husband is fixed. Using her quantifier
εw on this unilateral context U
q
w(B,C) we obtain her preferred outcomes for
the context
εw(U
q
w(B,C)) = {(rw, rh) | rw ∈ max
x∈Xw
pi1(U
q
w(B,C)(x))} = {(2, 1), (2, 2)}
since maxx∈Xw pi1(U
q
w(B,C)(x)) = {2}. Similarly, for the husband, his uni-
lateral context with respect to this strategy profile x = (B,C) is
U qh(B,C)(x) =


(3, 2) if x = B
(2, 1) if x = C
(2, 2) if x = F.
Hence, his preferred outcomes for this context are
εh(U
q
h(B,C)) = {(rw, rh) | rh ∈ max
x∈Xh
pi2(U
q
h(B,C)(x))} = {(3, 2), (2, 2)}.
Using this notion of a unilateral map we can abstract the classical defini-
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tion of Nash equilibrium to general games defined by selection functions as
follows.
Definition 4.6 (General Nash equilibrium). Given a general game (εi, q),
we say that a strategy profile x is in Nash equilibrium iff
q(x) ∈ εi(U
q
i (x))
for all players 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
As with the usual notion of Nash equilibrium, we are also saying that
a strategy profile is in Nash equilibrium if no player has a motivation to
unilaterally change their strategy. This is expressed formally by saying that
preferred outcomes, specified by the selection function when applied to the
unilateral context, contain the outcome obtained by sticking with the current
strategy. We illustrate now how this notion indeed coincides with the usual
notion when selection functions are maximisation functions:
Example 4.7 (Extended Battle of the Sexes III). There are obviously four
strategy profiles which are Nash equilibria, namely x = (B,B) and x = (C,C)
and x = (F, F ) and x = (B,F ), in the standard sense. Let us see how
x = (B,C) is not an equilibrium, also in our sense. Consider first the wife
(w). As we have calculated her set of preferred outcomes in her unilateral
context U qw(B,C) is {(2, 1), (2, 2)}, and indeed
q(B,C) = (2, 1) ∈ {(2, 1), (2, 2)} = εw(U
q
w(B,C))
so that the wife is happy with the current choice (she is happy to be alone,
as long as she is at the ballet). On the other hand, for the husband we have
calculated that his preferred outcomes in the unilateral context U qh(B,C) are
{(3, 2), (2, 2)}, which in this case does not include the current outcome
q(B,C) = (2, 1) /∈ {(3, 2), (2, 2)} = εh(U
q
h(B,C)).
Hence, the husband can improve his situation by either going to the football
on his own or joining his wife at the ballet. Similarly to above one can verify
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that all four standard equilibria are also equilibria in the sense of Definition
4.6.
4.2 Selection Equilibrium
The definition of Nash equilibrium is based on quantifiers. However, we can
also use selection functions directly to define an equilibrium condition.
Definition 4.8 (Selection equilibrium). Suppose each player’s move is a good
move in the unilateral context, that is,
xi ∈ εi(U
q
i (x))
for all players 1 ≤ i ≤ n, where xi is the ith component of the tuple x. A
strategy profile satisfying this condition for each player is called a selection
equilibrium.
Our goal in this section is to show that selection equilibrium is a strict
refinement of generalised Nash equilibrium. We start by showing that every
selection equilibrium is also an equilibrium in the sense of Definition 4.6.
Theorem 4.9. Every selection equilibrium is a generalised Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Recall that by definition, for every context p we have
x ∈ εi(p) =⇒ p(x) ∈ εi(p)
since εi(p) = {p(x) | x ∈ εi(p)}. Assuming that x is a selection equilibrium
we have
xi ∈ εi(U
q
i (x))
Therefore
U qi (x)(xi) ∈ εi(U
q
i (x))
It remains to note that U qi (x)(xi) = q(x), because x[i 7→ xi] = x.
Let us again illustrate this new concept using our running example.
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Example 4.10 (Extended Battle of the Sexes IV). As before, to illustrate
concepts, consider the wife and the strategy profile x = (B,C). Her selection
function yields:
εw(U
q
w(B,C)) = {rw | U
q
w(B,C)(rw) ∈ max
x∈Xw
pi1(U
q
w(B,C)(x))} = {C}.
As it holds that her current choice xw = B does not belong to this set of
preferred strategies, the strategy profile would not be in selection equilibrium
from the point of view of the wife. Looking from the point of view of the
husband, on the strategy profile x = (B,C) we can calculate his preferred
strategies using his selection function as
εh(U
q
h(B,C)) = {rh | U
q
h(B,C)(rh) ∈ max
x∈Xh
pi2(U
q
h(B,C)(x))} = {B,F}.
But his current choice is xh = C, so he would also be tempted to change his
mind and go to either the ballet with his wife, or to the football on his own.
In our version of the Battle of the Sexes game the set of generalised Nash
equilibria and the set selection equilibria are in fact identical. This is not
a coincidence, as the following theorem shows that for games based on the
maximisation selection function the classical notion, and our two generalised
notions coincide.
Theorem 4.11. In a strategic game (see Remark 4.2) the standard definition
of Nash equilibrium and the equilibrium notions of Definitions 4.6 and 4.8
are equivalent.
Proof. Suppose the set of outcomes R is Rn and that the selection functions
εi are i-argmax, i.e. maximising with respect to i-th coordinate. Unfolding
Definition 4.8 and that of a unilateral context U qi (x), we see that a tuple x
is an equilibrium strategy profile if for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n
xi ∈ i- argmax
x∈Xi
q(x[i 7→ x])).
But xi is a point on which the function p(x) = q(x[i 7→ x]) attains its
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maximum precisely when p(xi) ∈ maxx∈Xi p(x). Hence
q(x) = q(x[i 7→ xi]) = p(xi) = max
x∈Xi
p(x) = max
x∈Xi
q(x[i 7→ x])
which is the standard definition of a Nash equilibrium: for each player i, the
outcome obtained by not changing the strategy, i.e. q(x), is the best possible
amongst the outcomes when any other available strategy is considered, i.e.
maxx∈Xi q(x[i 7→ x]). The same holds for our Definition 4.6 based on the
quantifier εi.
Theorem 4.11 above shows that in the case of “classical” strategic games
the usual concept of a Nash equilibrium coincides with both the general Nash
equilibrium and the selection equilibrium. On the other hand, for general
games, Theorem 4.9 proves that every selection equilibrium is a generalised
Nash equilibrium
selection equilibria ( generalised Nash equilibria
In Section 5 we give several examples showing that the inclusion above is
strict, i.e. that there are games where selection equilibrium is a strict refine-
ment of generalised Nash equilibrium.
We close this section with a last consideration of the classic Battle of the
Sexes (Example 4.3). Here, we analyze the game in a different way. We
do not use utility functions and we do not use max operators as selection
functions.
4.3 Battle of the Sexes – Qualitatively
Let us represent the Battle of the Sexes game in our framework in a truly
idiomatic way, by removing numerical utilities completely and focussing only
on the qualitative information. The choices of moves are still Xw = Xh =
{B,F}, but now the outcomes are merely a description of what happens,
namely who goes to which event. We set R = Xw × Xh = {B,F}
2, so an
element of R is a pair where the first coordinate tells what the wife chose,
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and the second tells what the husband chose. Now the outcome function
q : Xw ×Xh → R is simply the identity function.
We build selection functions for each player in a compositional way, by
observing that each player has a lexicographic preference: their first priority
is to be coordinated, and all else being equal, their second priority is to
go to their favourite event (ballet and football, respectively). We describe
an element of R as ‘coordinated’ if its first coordinate equals its second
coordinate, so the coordinated outcomes are (B,B) and (F, F ). There is
a selection function εc that chooses all moves that lead to a coordinated
outcome, which we can write as an inverse image
εc(p) = p
−1({(B,B), (F, F )})
Next we have a pair of selection functions εb, εf representing the ‘purely
selfish’ aims of attending ballet and football respectively:
εb(p) = p
−1({(B,B), (B,F )})
εf(p) = p
−1({(B,F ), (F, F )})
Now we are ready to build our players’ selection functions compositionally.
Given a context, the joint selection function checks whether there are any
moves which satisfy both ‘personalities’ given by the coordinating and selfish
selection functions. If so, the joint selection function returns those moves. If
there are no moves satisfying both then the coordination takes priority, and
the selfish aspect is ignored. Therefore the wife’s selection function is
εw(p) =


εc(p) ∩ εb(p) if nonempty
εc(p) otherwise
and the husband’s selection function is
εh(p) =


εc(p) ∩ εf(p) if nonempty
εc(p) otherwise
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Observe that in building these selection functions we have not assumed that
the game’s outcome function is the identity function, and so these selection
functions will still work correctly if we change the rules of the game, for
example if the couple have an agreement that sometimes forces them to go
against their choices.
We will verify that (B,B) is a selection equilibrium, and (B,F ) is not.
For the strategy (B,B) the wife’s unilateral context is
U idw (B,B)(x) = (x,B)
The individual selection functions give
εc(U
id
w (B,B)) = {B} εb(U
id
w (B,B)) = {B}
and so the wife’s selection function gives
εw(U
id
w (B,B)) = {B}
which means the wife has no incentive to deviate. The husband’s unilateral
context is
U idh (B,B)(x) = (B, x)
The individual selection functions give
εc(U
id
h (B,B)) = {B} εf(U
id
h (B,B)) = {F}
Now we have a clash between the two personalities because these sets do not
intersect. The coordination takes priority, and so
εh(U
id
h (B,B)) = {B}
and the husband has no incentive to deviate. Therefore (B,B) is a selection
equilibrium.
For the strategy (B,F ) we see that the husband has an incentive to
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unilaterally deviate to B. His unilateral context is
U idh (B,F )(x) = (B, x)
The individual selection functions give
εc(U
id
h (B,F )) = {B} εf(U
id
h (B,F )) = {F}
and so
εh(U
id
h (B,F )) = {B}
Therefore the husband has an incentive to deviate to B, and so (B,F ) is not
a selection equilibrium.
Although this is a trivial example, we believe that this method of mod-
elling will distinguish itself from utility-based methods in its ability to scale
easily to very complex situations. A realistic agent may have many com-
peting aims, some context-dependent and some context-independent (for ex-
ample immediate profit, long-term profit, fairness concerns, environmental
concerns). Using selection functions allows us to treat each aim individually,
and then afterwards combine them (with rules for breaking ties, such as the
lexicographic rule in this example) into a realistic description of the agent.
We will discuss these ideas in the conclusion.
5 Examples
In this section we continue to work on Example 3.6 where three judges J =
{J1, J2, J3} vote for two contestants A and B. The set of possible outcomes is
X = {A,B} and the actual outcome is determined by the majority function
maj : X ×X ×X → X . We have chosen to work with three judges and two
possible outcomes in order to simplify the exposition, so that maj becomes
a total function.
In contrast to Example 3.6, where the decisions of judges 2 and 3 were
fixed, in the current section we analyse a game where all three players make
strategic decisions. We analyse several instances of this game with different
30
motivations of players in order to illustrate the expressiveness of selection
functions. Moreover, we explore the distinction between Nash equilibria and
selection equilibria. Our specific examples contain implausible Nash equilib-
ria which are not selection equilibria. Indeed, we have examples in which
every strategy is a Nash equilibrium, but there are few selection equilibria.
5.1 Games with Context-independent Selection Func-
tions
In a strategic game, the judges rank the contestants according to a preference
ordering. For example, suppose judges 1 and 2 prefer A and judge 3 prefers
B. Thus for each judge we have an order relation on X . Suppose the order
relation of the first judge is B 1 A, the second judge is B 2 A and the
third is A 3 B.
The judges now attempt to maximise the outcome with respect to their
preferred ordering. Hence we obtain 3 different selection functions, which are
maximisation with respect to each ordering:
ε1(p) = argmax
x1∈(X,1)
p(x1)
ε2(p) = argmax
x2∈(X,2)
p(x2)
ε3(p) = argmax
x3∈(X,3)
p(x3).
In this particular example (but not in general) we can fix a ‘global’ order
B  A and notice that 3 is the dual order. Thus we can for short refer to
ε1 and ε2 as argmax and ε3 as argmin.
The game is represented in Table 3. Notice that Nash and selection
equilibria coincide for this game, because it is a strategic game.
There is a subtle difference between this setup and the usual strategic
game. In the classical approach, each judge’s ordering would be seen as a
preference relation. This would typically be used to derive payoffs [18], which
amounts to an order embedding of X into R. Here there are no payoffs: we
directly maximise over the discrete order X .
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Table 3: Agents: max, max, min
Strategy Outcome Nash Defects Selection Defects
AAA A
AAB A
ABA A - J3 - J3
ABB B - J2 - J2
BAA A - J3 - J3
BAB B - J1 - J1
BBA B - J1, J2 - J1, J2
BBB B
We now want to give the calculations of the Nash equilibria of Table 3 in
the notation of selection functions and unilateral contexts. First we take a
look at the Nash equilibrium BBB with outcome maj(BBB) = B and give
the rationale of player 1. The unilateral context of player 1 is
Umaj1 (BBB)(x) = maj(xBB) = B
meaning that in the given context the outcome is B no matter what player
1 chooses to play. The minimisation quantifier applied to such unilateral
context gives
ε1(U
maj
1 (BBB)) = max
1
(Umaj1 (BBB)) = {B}
meaning that, in the given context, player 1’s preferred outcome is B. Hence,
we can conclude by B = maj(BBB) ∈ ε1(U
maj
1 (BBB)(x)) = {B} that B is a
Nash equilibrium strategy for player 1. This condition holds for each player
and allows us to conclude that BBB is a Nash equilibrium. In a similar way
way we see in
B = maj(BBA) /∈ ε1(U
maj
1 (BBA)(x)) = {A}
since Umaj1 (BBA)(x) = maj(xBA) = x, so that BBA is not a Nash equi-
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librium. In other words, in the context BBA player 1 has an incentive to
change his strategy to A, so that the new outcome maj(ABA) = A is better
than the previous outcome B.
5.2 Keynesian Beauty Contest
Let us now consider the Keynesian beauty contest as the paradigmatic exam-
ple of a game with some players having context-dependent selection functions.
The first judge J1 ranks the candidates according to a preference ordering
B  A. The second and third judges, however, are ‘Keynesian agents’: they
have no preference relations over the candidates per se, but want to vote for
the winning candidate.
The selection equilibria are precisely those in which J2 and J3 are coordi-
nated, and J1 is not pivotal in any of these. In the next section we will explain
in more detail how the fixpoint selection function models coordination. Table
4 contains a summary of the equilibria.
Consider the strategy AAA, which is a selection equilibrium of this game.
Suppose the moves of J1 and J2 are fixed, but J3 may unilaterally change
strategy. The unilateral context is
Umaj3 (AAA)(x) = maj(AAx) = A
Thus the unilateral context is a constant function, and its set of fixpoints is
fix(Umaj3 (AAA)) = {A}
This tells us that J3 has no incentive to unilaterally change to the strategy
B, because he will no longer be voting for the winner.
On the other hand, for the strategy ABB the two Keynes agents are
indifferent, because if either of them unilaterally changes to A then A will
become the majority and they will still be voting for the winner. This is still
a selection equilibrium (as we would expect) because the unilateral context
is the identity function, and in particular B is a fixpoint.
There are two selection equilibria, BAA and BBB, which are implausible
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Table 4: Agents: max, fix, fix
Strategy Outcome Nash Defects Selection Defects
AAA A
AAB A - J3
ABA A - J2
ABB B
BAA A
BAB B - J1 - J1, J2
BBA B - J1 - J1, J3
BBB B
in the sense that J1 is not voting for his preferred candidate.
We now calculate the Nash and the selection rationale for the strategy
profile AAB of the Keynesian player 3. The outcome of AAB is maj(AAB) =
A. The unilateral context of player 3 is
Umaj3 (AAB)(x) = maj(AAx) = A
meaning that the outcome is (still) A if player 3 unilaterally changes from B
to A. The minimisation quantifier applied to this context gives
ε3(U
maj
3 (AAB)) = fix(U
maj
3 (AAB)) = {A}
meaning that A is the outcome resulting from an optimal choice. Hence, we
can conclude by
A = maj(AAB) ∈ ε3(U
maj
3 (AAB)) = {A}
that B is a Nash equilibrium strategy for player 3.
The rationale for the selection equilibrium is as follows: the strategy
B /∈ ε3(U
maj
3 (AAB)) = fix(U
maj
3 (AAB)) = {A} meaning that AAB is not a
selection equilibrium.
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Table 5: Agents: fix, fix, fix
Strategy Outcome Nash Defects Selection Defects
AAA A
AAB A - J3
ABA A - J2
ABB B - J1
BAA A - J1
BAB B - J2
BBA B - J3
BBB B
5.3 Coordination Game
We consider a game where all agents act according to a fixpoint goal. Judges
J1, J2 and J3 want to vote for the winner, so the selection functions are
given by the fixpoint operator (X → X) → P(X). As can be seen in Table
5, the selection equilibria are exactly the coordinated strategies. Note that
the fixpoint selection function models coordination, and the game in which
all selection functions are fixpoints is a coordination game. This gives us a
new perspective on the Keynesian beauty contest as a one-sided coordination
game: the Keynesian agent would like to coordinate with the group, whereas
the agents of the group are not interested in coordination.
This game is a good example of why ordinary Nash equilibria are not
suitable for modelling games with context-dependent quantifiers: it can be
seen in the table that every strategy is a Nash equilibrium of this game, but
the selection equilibrium captures our intuition perfectly that the equilibria
should be the strategy profiles that are maximally coordinated, namely AAA
and BBB.
5.4 Anti-coordination Game
Just as the fixpoint selection function models coordination, so there is a ‘non-
fixpoint’ selection function which models anti-coordination (or differentiation
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Table 6: Agents: non-fix, non-fix, non-fix
Strategy Winner Nash Defects Selection Defects
AAA A - J1, J2, J3
AAB A
ABA A
ABB B
BAA A
BAB B
BBA B
BBB B - J1, J2, J3
as in the minority game [1, 13]). The set of non-fixpoints of a function
p : X → X is
non-fix(p) = {x ∈ X | x 6= p(x)}
Obviously this set might be empty, for instance when p is the identity func-
tion. Hence, we extend this to a total selection function by specifying that
the player is indifferent in the event that there are no non-fixpoints
ε(p) =


non-fix(p) if non-fix(p) 6= ∅
X otherwise
Unlike for fixpoints, this selection function does not attain itself when con-
sidered as a quantifier. The corresponding quantifier is instead:
ε(p) = {p(x) | x 6= p(x)}
In a game such as an election, an agent whose selection function is non-fix is
a ‘punk’ who aims to be in a minority. Therefore, let us consider the game in
which all three judges are punks (see Table 6). Of course only one can actually
be in a minority, so the selection equilibria are precisely the ‘maximally anti-
coordinated’ strategy profiles, namely those in which one judge differs from
the other two. This is another example of a game in which every strategy
is a Nash equilibrium, but the selection equilibrium corresponds perfectly to
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our intuition.
6 Compiling Games
In Section 5.2, we modeled the Keynesian beauty contest. We showed that
the set of Nash equilibria and the set of selection equilibria do not coincide. In
Section 4.2 we proved that both equilibrium concepts are isomorphic when we
only consider max and argmax as quantifier, respectively selection function.
The natural question for the Keynesian beauty contest is: Is there a way
to model the game using standard payoff functions and what is the set of
equilibria we get?
For the reasons exposed in Section 3.4, there is no general utility represen-
tation of the fixpoint goals. As long as the outcomes are defined in terms of
the candidate who wins the contest, it is not possible to consider an ordering
of these outcomes alone but contextual information is also important.
There are two things an analyst can do. First, he can redefine the out-
come space and define new utility functions on these outcomes for the Keynes
agents. This, however, would make it necessary to change the outcome func-
tion globally for all players. Secondly, for the given outcome function, he can
find payoffs by hand that mimick an agent’s fixpoint goals. That would mean
to give up a compact and meaningful description of an agent via a utility
function. Moreover, for each new game payoffs have to be calculated again.
Table 7 illustrates this approach for the Keynesian beauty contest. The
last three columns depict the computed payoff matrix. In column ‘NE sim.
SNE’ (‘Nash equilibrium simulating selection equilibrium’) we denote the
Nash equilibria. Comparing it to Table 4 shows that the Nash equilibria now
simulate the selection equilibria. To attain the payoff functions for jugdes 2
and 3 (judge 1 prefers candidate A over B), the analyst solves the game for
their fixpoint goals.
Consider the strategy profiles AAA and AAB. These strategy profiles
yield the same outcome: A is the winner of the contest. In this situation
judge 3 is not pivotal; independently of his action, A will win the contest.
Now, to achieve the context-dependency in this game using payoff functions,
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Table 7: Agents: max, fix, fix
Strategy Outcome NE sim. S NE Defects PJ1 PJ2 PJ3
AAA A 1 1 1
AAB A - J3 1 1 0
ABA A - J2 1 0 1
ABB B 0 1 1
BAA A 1 1 1
BAB B - J1, J2 0 0 1
BBA B - J1, J3 0 1 0
BBB B 0 1 1
the analyst has to introduce differences in the payoffs for the same final
outcome. I.e., he provides different payoffs for the different actions leading
to the same outcome and is thus implicitly using contextual information.
Contrast this with the selection function approach. Selection functions
can not only be defined on the set of outcomes but on the whole function
space of unilateral contexts. Thus, when considering the beauty contest, the
outcome function is the same for an agent who is merely concerned with the
final outcomes, such as judge 1 in our example, or who is concerned with the
context, like the fixpoint judges 2 and 3. Selection functions do not convey
implicitly the context-dependency but explicitly highlight it.
Fixpoint goals are but one example. In general, the feature that we can
equip players with goals depending on the game description itself (described
by the outcome function) makes the selection approach more expressive and
more compositional because there is no need to change the global outcome
function but only the local representation of one player.9 As a further con-
sequence, this widens the possibilites to do comparative statics within the
same game.
In the case an analyst wants to encode context-dependent information in
a given game, there is a very simple procedure for calculating the payoffs such
that the Nash equilibrium mimicks the selection one: we write 0 whenever
9Or, alternatively, there is no need to solve the game and encode context-dependent
information by hand.
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the player defects and 1 whenever they do not defect (cf Table 7).
Besides convenience, there is another reason this is important: it gives
a very simple way to talk about mixed strategies. A good example of this
is the beauty context variant (max,min, fix). In this game J1 prefers A, J2
prefers B and J3 would like to vote for the winner. Intuitively we expect
this game to have an equilibrium in which J1 votes for A, J2 votes for B and
J3 mixes with arbitrary probability. By ‘compiling’ the game to a classical
utility function representation we regain these mixed equilibria. Although we
are working on directly representing mixed strategies in the selection function
framework, using this procedure is simple and effective. In particular, if we
begin with a finite game and compile it, we obtain a strategic game to which
Nash’s theorem applies (whereas there is no reason to expect our original
game to have any equilibria).
Theorem 6.1. Consider a game G defined by total selection functions εi :
(Xi → R) → PXi and outcome function q :
∏
iXi → R. We define a
strategic game G ′ to have the same move sets Xi, and the utility for the ith
player of the strategy x :
∏
iXi is defined by the outcome function
q(x)i =


1 if xi ∈ εi(U
q
i x)
0 otherwise
Then
1. A strategy x of G ′ is a Nash equilibrum iff all players receive utility 1
2. The Nash equilibria of G ′ are exactly the selection equilibria of G
Proof. Notice that (2) follows immediately from (1), since by the construction
of q′ a strategy x is a selection equilibria of G iff all players receive utility 1 in
G ′. To prove (1) we first note that if all players receive 1 utility from a strategy
x then trivially it is a Nash equilibrium, since getting more than 1 utility is
impossible. Now suppose we have a strategy x where some player (say the
ith) receives utility 0, and we will prove that x it is not a Nash equilibrium of
G ′. Let p be the unilateral context p = U qi (x). Since a selection function can
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never return the empty set, choose some x′ ∈ εi(p). In particular, x
′ 6= xi
since otherwise we would have q′(x)i = 1. Let x
′ = x[i 7→ x′] be the strategy
in which player i unilaterally changed from xi to x
′, and let p′ = U qi (x
′) be
its unilateral context. Since U qi (x) is independent of the value of xi, we have
an equality of contexts p = p′, and so in particular εi(p) = εi(p
′). Therefore
x′ ∈ εi(p
′), so q′(x′)i = 1, which proves that player i can increase his utility
from 0 to 1 by unilaterally changing from x to x′.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we propose the use of quantifiers and selection functions to
model individual choices and games. Our framework instantiates preferences
and utility functions as a special case but we can also model agents whose
preferences are incomplete, who deviate from maximization, whose motives
are not only influenced by the outcome but also by the way outcomes realize.
In practice, economists often restrict themselves to model decisions or
interactions using utility functions. We think this practice has two main
negative side-effects our framework helps to overcome.
First, sticking to utility functions excludes interesting phenomena from
analysis. The descriptions and explanations of behavior exclusively live in
the framework of full optimization (or equivalently in having rational prefer-
ences). Yet, empirical evidence suggests that people’s behavior deviates from
this benchmark. Our framework contributes by introducing a whole new set
of alternatives to describe behavior.
Secondly, utility functions and preferences are but one formal encoding
of economic situations. Even if a formal equivalence between utility maxi-
mization and selection functions exists, the naturalness of representing the
economic problem via selection functions may be different and more insight-
ful. Selection functions allow a high-level and a more abstract description
than utility functions. We illustrated this focusing on one example: fixpoint
selection functions as a high-level representation of coordination goals. The
abstraction has a further crucial advantage: It introduces compositionality.
Whereas with utility functions it can be necessary to either change the out-
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come space or change payoffs for a given outcome function by hand in order
to model behavior, with selection functions the global outcome function re-
mains unchanged and only the local selection functions have to be changed.
More generally, our modelling perspective on the different levels of ab-
straction is a well known pattern studied extensively in computer science.
Any mathematical or logical language for knowledge representation [9] faces
a trade off between the goals of representation and reasoning [3], page 327:
”[. . .] why do we not attempt to define a formal knowledge representation
language that is coextensive with a natural language like English? [. . .] Al-
though such a highly expressive language would certainly be desirable from
a representation standpoint, it leads to serious difficulties from a reasoning
standpoint.”
The difference between using utility functions and selection functions is
that both differ in their representational power. The natural language de-
scription of an economic situation can be more directly translated into the
high level formal system of selection functions as opposed to the low level
classical approach. We have depicted both in Figure 1. In our approach,
the payoff matrix as in Table 7, can be automatically computed, and the
modeller needs only to decide which selection functions represent the agents
and which outcome function represents the situation. The classical approach
is depicted in Figure 1 by a translation into the payoff matrices.
Our approach of context-dependent modeling of the left part of Figure
1 can thus be seen as a modelling technique to reduce the gap between the
high level description of an economic situation in natural language and the
formal modelling language. Selection functions are mid-level in between the
high level natural language and the low level language of utility maximization
represented traditionally in calculus in classical games.
An account for the representational power of languages is an involved
research topic and even more raising the expressivity while not sacrificing
reasonability. However, our hypothesis is that this higher-order approach
increases the expressivity of the representation language for game theory
while not sacrificing reasoning possibilities.
In fact, our framework is ready for automated reasoning, as opposed to
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Figure 1: Context depended and classical modelling
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Haskell
Haskell
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calculus [19]. Our approach is directly programmable in modern functional
languages like Haskell that has been developed within the high level mod-
ern mathematical type theory [20] in order to increase the expressivity of
imperative languages such as Fortran or Matlab. The essence of functional
languages is the usage of higher order functions that take and output other
functions like selection functions, quantifier and outcome functions. Func-
tional programming languages can be understood as languages to design
languages. A typical approach to programing via functional languages is to
design a domain specific language that allows to express the problems in a
most direct and natural way while the program is compiled with its problem
declaration into the low level solution steps of an intermediate imperative or
a very low level machine language. This is much in the spirit of our approach
to compile the selection function model into the payoff matrix of a classical
representation of the Keynesian beauty contest game in Table 7.
Regarding automation, we have heavily taken advantage of a prototype
Haskell tool that calculates equilibria by brute force (enumeration of all
strategies) for the games we have discussed in this paper. In fact the discov-
ery of the notion of selection equilibrium has been a direct consequence of
using the tool. Before using the software we were misguided by our intuition,
and did not recognise the difference between Nash equilibria and selection
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equilibria.
There are several avenues for future research. In this paper, we introduced
a framework, so clearly the overall usefulness of our approach will depend
on providing interesting applications. Secondly, we will extend the theory of
selection functions to other classes of games, such as repeated and sequential
games, as well as games of incomplete information. Lastly, we see a huge po-
tential in using functional languages to model games, in particular large and
complex games. We are currently working on a prototpye Haskell tool that
allows us to do exactly that. Moreover we are working on the use of mon-
ads (a very powerful paradigm for programming with higher order functions,
implemented with great success in Haskell) to model computational effects
in economics such as non-determinism, stochastic choice, memory and global
state.
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